NONFATAL DEATH SENTENCES
JACOB BRONSTHER*
Introduction
This Symposium Essay attempts to unite the movements against the death
penalty and mass incarceration. My central argument is that many noncapital
sentences are in the same category of injury as the death penalty. Thus, if you
believe that the death penalty is impermissibly degrading or otherwise
inconsistent with human dignity, then you ought to oppose these noncapital
sentences in the same manner.
In this way, I reject the premise of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
that “death is different.”1 While an array of procedural and substantive
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1. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286, 289 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“Death is a unique punishment . . . .”) (“Death . . . is in a class by itself.”); id. at 306 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (“The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not
in degree but in kind.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (joint opinion of Justice
Stewart, Justice Powell, and Justice Stevens) (“[T]he penalty of death is different in kind from
any other punishment . . . .”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (joint
opinion of Justice Stewart, Justice Powell, and Justice Stevens) (“[T]he penalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.”); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“[T]his qualitative difference between death and other penalties
calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed.”); Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (citing the Court’s “qualitative difference” jurisprudence
for the death penalty); id. at 468 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he
death penalty is qualitatively different from any other punishment, and hence must be
accompanied by unique safeguards . . . .”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 340 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It hardly needs reiteration that this Court has consistently
acknowledged the uniqueness of the punishment of death.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority opinion as “the pinnacle of . . .
death-is-different jurisprudence”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605–06 (2002) (“[T]here is
no doubt that ‘[d]eath is different.’” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)); id. at
614 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment requires States to
apply special procedural safeguards when they seek the death penalty.”).
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protections apply to capital sentences,2 jurisdictions can impose any
noncapital sentence so long as they have a “reasonable basis for believing”
that the punishment will serve either deterrent, retributive, rehabilitative, or
incapacitative goals.3 Twenty-five years to life for the “third strike” of
stealing roughly $1,200 worth of golf clubs notoriously met that standard.4
So too did a life sentence for fraud crimes totaling roughly $230,5 as did a
life sentence without the possibility of parole for possession of 1.5 pounds of
cocaine, the defendant’s first offense.6 So the Court believes that death is one
thing, and prison is something else. I disagree.
The point, however, is not that all punishments, no matter the severity,
belong in the same category of moral concern and judicial review. I believe
we should make a qualitative distinction such that certain punishments are
impermissible regardless of our positive justifications of punishment, that is,
regardless of how proportionate they might be as a matter of retribution, how
effective they might be as a matter of deterrence, and so forth.7 But we should
draw the line differently. The right question is not whether the sentence ends
the offender’s biological existence, but whether it denies their humanity.
Justice Brennan expressed this general idea in his celebrated Furman v.
Georgia concurrence, writing that the “true significance” of punishments that
violate the Eighth Amendment “is that they treat members of the human race
as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded.”8
2. See generally CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2016) (providing a critical overview of the
Court’s constitutional regulation of the death penalty); id. at 227–29 (explaining how some
states have undermined substantive protections, such as the ban on executing intellectually
disabled people, through onerous procedural requirements).
3. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 28 (2003). There has been only one case in
which a term of incarceration, standing alone, was held to be disproportionate to an otherwise
validly defined crime for an adult. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279–81, 303 (1983)
(reversing life without parole sentence for the crime of writing a fake check, Helm’s seventh
felony conviction in South Dakota since 1964).
4. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28, 30–31.
5. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265–66, 285 (1980) (listing the charges as (1)
fraudulently obtaining $80 of goods or services, (2) forging a check for $28.36, and (3)
acquiring $120.75 by false pretenses).
6. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996 (1991).
7. See Jacob Bronsther, Torture and Respect, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 423, 427
(2019) [hereinafter Bronsther, Torture and Respect] (“A punishment may be a proportional
and parsimonious means of securing retribution or deterrence, while nonetheless being
impermissibly degrading.”).
8. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272–73 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis
added); see also Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011) (“Prisoners retain the essence of

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol75/iss1/3

2022]

NONFATAL DEATH SENTENCES

9

But what does it mean, exactly, to treat someone as “human” or
“nonhuman”? This Essay seeks to initiate a broader discussion by suggesting,
in concert with Aristotle and an array of contemporary philosophers, that the
essentially “human” capacity is the ability to stitch past, present, and future
moments together into a good life as a whole.9 On this view, humans are
fundamentally diachronic creatures who live through (dia) time (chronos).10
Beyond philosophy, as a matter of cultural concepts and ideals, our society
tends to conceive of a normal and valuable “human” life in this general
manner, as something that one realizes through essentially long-term
associations and achievements, such as maintaining romantic partnerships
and old friendships, raising children, building professional expertise, and so
forth. Thus, if the state treats offenders as creatures without the ability or
right to construct a meaningful life of their own through time—as it does
when it kills them or confines them to prison for, say, twenty years—then it
treats them as “nonhumans,” whether as a matter of objective or culturally
determined values. And if we believe that people do not forfeit their standing
as humans when they commit offenses, then we ought not inflict such
punishments.
This Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I considers how exactly the death
penalty harms a person, given the fact that everyone will eventually die. I
argue that the death penalty moves up a person’s death date, likely by
decades, and thereby grievously interferes with their unfolding life as a
whole. By intentionally harming a person in this manner, the state expresses
the conviction that the person’s essentially “human” status as a life-builder
either is non-existent or immaterial. Part II argues that decades-long prison
sentences objectively and expressively harm individuals in a similar manner.
human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man.”); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis
of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553, 557 (1998) (arguing that offenders remain
“members of the community” who must not be treated “as children or animals”); AVISHAI
MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 143 (Naomi Goldblum trans. 1996) (“Rejecting a human
being by humiliating her means rejecting the way she expresses herself as a human. It is
precisely this fact that gives content to the abstract concept of humiliation as the rejection of
human beings as human.”).
9. See Bronsther, Torture and Respect, supra note 7, at 465–73; Jacob Bronsther, LongTerm Incarceration and the Moral Limits of Punishment, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 2369, 2376–
84, 2405–10 (2020) [hereinafter Bronsther, Moral Limits of Punishment].
10. Bronsther, Torture and Respect, supra note 7, at 428; Bronsther, Moral Limits of
Punishment, supra note 9, at 2380.
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While I believe this means that these prison sentences are flatly
impermissible, there is a more modest conclusion available that still offers
the possibility of radical policy change. That is, if one insisted that the death
penalty was permissible, then such sentences would also be permissible, but
only in those presumably very rare cases in which they believed that capital
punishment would be an acceptable alternative. Finally, Part II raises the
possibility that shorter prison sentences, when combined with the collateral
consequences of conviction, belong in this category of life-crushing
punishments beyond the pale.
I. The Harm of Death
There are contingent and non-contingent reasons to oppose the death
penalty. Contingent reasons include concerns about the role of racial
animus11 or even sheer randomness12 in determining who receives the death
penalty, or about the efficacy of the death penalty in terms of deterring future
offenses.13 From this perspective, the death penalty could be justified were it
distributed in a non-racist or non-random manner, or were it an efficient
means of general deterrence.14
11. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the
Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519 (1995);
Catherine M. Grosso et al., Local History, Practice, and Statistics: A Study on the Influence
of Race on the Administration of Capital Punishment in Hamilton County, Ohio (January
1992–August 2017), 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 902 (2020); Catherine M. Grosso et al.,
Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal Overview, in AMERICA’S
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 525 (James R. Acker et al., eds., 3d ed. 2014).
12. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual. . . . I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate
the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be
so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE
INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 156, 160 (2d ed., augmented 1981) (discussing the
imperfect nature of the administration of the death penalty).
13. See, e.g., John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence
in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2005) (“We find that the existing
evidence for deterrence [by the death penalty] is surprisingly fragile . . . .”).
14. Another “contingent” argument against the death penalty is that it is irreversible

when imposed on someone who is later found to be innocent. For trenchant criticism of
the idea that “irreversibility” represents a unique concern in the death penalty context,
given the fact that prison sentences are also noncompensable injuries, see Rachel Barkow,
The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the
Case for Uniformity, 10 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1174–75 (2009) (“[A] sentence of life
imprisonment is also irreversible once it has been served, as is any term of years in prison
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However, non-contingent reasons to oppose the death penalty have a
different structure. They foreclose the death penalty regardless of how fairly
it might be distributed and, more broadly, regardless of what the traditional
justifications of punishment might have to say about its infliction. The idea
is something like this: Even if retributive proportionality demands capital
punishment, and even if capital punishment were a wonderfully efficient
means of deterrence and social norm maintenance, you cannot do that to a
human being.15 I suspect that most capital punishment abolitionists endorse
both non-contingent and contingent rationales, whatever their respective
merits as a matter of law and politics in the American context.16 In any event,
in this Essay I will focus only on the non-contingent rationale, that is, the
notion that the death penalty harms an offender in a manner that is
inconsistent with their humanity. However, in making the non-contingent
rationale my focus, I am making no claim as to its relative moral importance
vis-á-vis the other rationales (i.e., even if the death penalty in the abstract
were humane and permissible, the racist administration of such state violence
would still be unspeakably bad).17
If the harm of capital punishment might be inconsistent with someone’s
humanity, how, exactly, does the punishment harm someone? This question
is much harder to answer than we might expect. There are, I believe, two
distinct but interrelated components to the harm. First, there is the “objective”
harm associated with the death itself. Second, there is the “expressive” harm
that the defendant has endured that is excessive, arbitrary, or fails to reflect a defendant’s
individual circumstances. Those years cannot be brought back.”); see also Ronald J.
Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 65, 74 (2008) (“The
burden of proof at a criminal trial is beyond reasonable doubt, not certainty. Although the
matter is complicated, the very existence of such a standard seems to contemplate that
mistakes . . . will be made . . . .”).
15. See Bronsther, Moral Limits of Punishment, supra note 9, at 2376–84 (arguing that
“impermissible degradation constitutes a humanity-denying form of disrespect”); Bronsther,
Torture and Respect, supra note 7, at 430 (considering sentencing limitations that represent
external constraints on “the pursuit of our positive penal objectives”); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY,
Cruel and Unusual Punishments, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 223, 236 (1979) (“Even when proportionality is satisfied, however, we
shall not use a certain punishment if it is intrinsically degrading to the humanity of the
criminal—e.g. we shall not torture the torturer.”).
16. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003) (arguing that cultural and ideological
differences, especially related to the question of whether offenders retain their “dignity,”
explain the difference between the harsh American penal regime, on the one hand, and the
comparatively mild French and German regimes, on the other).
17. Thanks to Will Thomas for helpful discussion on this point.
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associated with the fact that it is the state that has intentionally caused the
death. Beginning with objective harm, let’s assume that the state executes the
person in question at age forty. This assumption narrows our “objective”
inquiry: How is it harmful or bad for someone to die at age forty?
Around 300 B.C., Epicurus argued famously that death is not harmful, at
all, for the person who has died.18 While, to my knowledge, Epicurus never
commented on the death penalty, his position inevitably leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that the imposition of death is the least harmful
punishment available. His argument depends on a particular variant of
hedonism, which provides that a person’s pleasurable sensations or
experiences are the only things that are intrinsically good for her, while her
painful sensations or experiences are the only things that are intrinsically bad
for her. Given that a person’s death is not an experience that she has, nor does
it cause her to have any sensations or experiences, Epicurus concludes that
her death is neither intrinsically good nor bad for her (and, thus, people
should stop worrying about death).19 To be sure, if one’s death were painful,
then that experience of pain will be bad for her, but not the death that follows.
An ancient but sporadic literature has emerged in reply to Epicurus and
his followers. For instance, to argue that death may be bad for those who die,
Thomas Nagel and others have appealed to what Steven Luper calls
the “comparativist” view, which compares possible lives.20 On this
account—which I simply assume to be true for the purposes of this piece—
something that makes one’s life as a whole worse than it otherwise would be
constitutes a harm to that person, while something that makes one’s life as a
whole better than it otherwise would be constitutes a benefit.21 That is, a
person normatively assesses a past occurrence (e.g., they ate an apple,
attended college, lost an arm) by asking whether they would have realized
more or less value over the course of their life were such occurrence never to

18. See EPICURUS, Letter to Menoeceus, in EPICURUS: THE EXTANT REMAINS 82, 85 (Cyril
Bailey ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1926) (c. 300 B.C.).
19. See id. at 85.
20. See STEVEN LUPER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF DEATH 7–8 (2009); THOMAS NAGEL, Death,
in MORTAL QUESTIONS 1, 8 (1979); see also Warren Quinn, Abortion: Identity and Loss,
13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 24, 40–48 (1984) (applying the comparativist view to abortion); Fred
Feldman, Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death, 100 PHIL. REV. 205 (1991) (challenging the
Epicurean stance that death is not harmful to the deceased, based on a comparativist view).
21. See Steven Luper, Death, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. ARCHIVE (Aug. 25, 2021),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/death/ (defining “comparativism”).
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have happened. Importantly, we need not experience an event for it to qualify
as a harm on the comparativist account.22 Nagel writes,
A man’s life includes much that does not take place within the
boundaries of his body and his mind, and what happens to him can
include much that does not take place within the boundaries of his
life. These boundaries are commonly crossed by the misfortunes
of being deceived, or despised, or betrayed.23
Thus, if someone spreads terrible lies about you, but you never find out about
it, that can qualify as a harm on the comparative view, while not registering
on the Epicurean account since the slander is not something that you
personally experience.24 In this way, even though we may not experience
death, it can still harm us, insofar as our lives as a whole would have been
better were we to continue living.
Thus, accepting the comparativist account, we should ask how death at
age forty might make one’s life as a whole worse than it would otherwise be,
in the sense that the individual would have realized more “value” over the
course of their existence had they died at a later point. This leads us to
wonder, in turn, what we mean by “value,” exactly, and how we might assess
whether one possible life exhibits more or less of it than another. I will only
be able to sketch some possible (but, I hope, intuitive) replies. First, from the
perspective of Epicurus (or Jeremy Bentham25), positive human value is
pleasure and negative human value is pain, such that we measure the
comparativist harm of death by calculating the likely amount and degree of
pleasure that one would have experienced were they to live longer, and then
subtract that by the likely amount and degree of pain.26 However, this
hedonistic conception of human value seems unnecessarily and inaccurately
constrained. For instance, as Robert Nozick argued, we don’t believe that a
life hooked up to a sophisticated pleasure machine is a good human life
overall, and yet the hedonist would be committed to “plugging in.”27
22. See Feldman, supra note 20, at 218 (“[A] state of affairs can be bad for a person
whether it occurs before he exists, while he exists, or after he exists.”).
23. NAGEL, supra note 20, at 6.
24. See id.; see also Harry S. Silverstein, The Evil of Death, 77 J. PHIL. 401, 420–24
(1980) (arguing that death harms us at no determinate time).
25. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT WITH AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Wilfred Harrison ed., Basil Blackwell
Oxford 1948) (1789) (developing a utilitarian moral and political philosophy).
26. See EPICURUS, supra note 18, at 82–93.
27. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42–45 (1974). But see Adam
Kolber, Mental Statism and the Experience Machine, 3 BARD J. SOC. SCI. 10, 15 (1994)
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Nor, following Donald Regan and David Enoch, does it seem that human
“value” is a simple matter of autonomy, such that all free choices exhibit an
equal amount of value, no matter their substantive content, just by virtue of
their autonomous origins.28 Rather, following Aristotle and a diverse and
distinguished array of philosophers, I suggest that autonomy exhibits “value”
when expressed in the context of people’s unfolding lives.29 As indicated
(arguing that, were we already hooked up to an experience machine, most of us would choose
not to “unplug,” and thus that Nozick’s case does not disprove mental-state utilitarian
theories).
28. See Donald H. Regan, The Value of Rational Nature, 112 ETHICS 267 (2002) (arguing
that rational nature cannot have value where there are no self-standing principles about good
states of affairs and activities); Donald H. Regan, How to Be a Moorean, 113 ETHICS 651
(2003) (arguing that agents necessarily take a critical stance in relation to their desires and that
they can only do so by relying on a conception of the good that is not itself reducible to their
desires); David Enoch, Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What Is
Constitutive of Action, 115 PHIL. REV. 169 (2006) (arguing that a complete account of action
and agency is not a complete account of normativity).
29. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, at 3–22 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans. 2000)
(c. 350 B.C.) (arguing that a person flourishes “over a complete life,” such that it is premature
to judge the quality of one’s life until it is finished); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF:
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 50–51 (1989) (“We want our lives to have meaning,
or weight, or substance, or to grow towards some fulness, or however the concern is
formulated . . . . But this means our whole lives. If necessary, we want the future to ‘redeem’
the past, to make it part of a life story which has sense or purpose, to take it up in a meaningful
unity.”); Connie S. Rosati, The Story of a Life, 30 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 21, 27 (2013)
(“[P]ersons not only attend to their lives from moment to moment; they also take up a view of
their lives as a whole, reflecting on themselves and their existence over time.”); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 216–19 (2d ed. 1984) (arguing that
man is “essentially a story-telling animal,” such that the good life is one that unfolds through
time with “narrative” unity); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62, 92–93, 399–416 (1971)
(maintaining that a good life consists in the approximate realization of a “rational life plan”—
the pursuit of one’s foundational aims, which are grounded in one’s reflective desires, and
with the plan’s details filled in over time, in the context of one’s evolving circumstances); JEFF
MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS OF LIFE 179–80 (2002)
(“[W]e must also recognize that well-being is multidimensional and that some of its
dimensions are relational—in particular those concerned with the meaning that a state or event
has within a person’s life.”); MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES 300–02
(1992) (arguing that the value of a life is a Moorean “organic whole”); CLARENCE IRVING
LEWIS, AN ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND VALUATION 498 (1946) (“The characteristic good
of willing and achieving is not one found in this or that passing instant merely, nor in an
aggregation of the goods thus momentarily and separately disclosed, but in the temporal and
relational pattern of a whole of experience whose progression is cumulative and
consummatory.”); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, DEATH AND THE AFTERLIFE (Niko Kolodny ed., 2013)
(arguing that what matters to us depends, in significant part, on the continued existence of
humanity).
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above, humans are diachronic creatures who live through (dia) time
(chronos).30 Put differently, humans are capable not only of enjoying
pleasurable “momentary goods,” like ice-cream cones, but also of achieving
“temporal goods,” like families, friendships, and careers, which must be
cultivated through time to be realized.31 Imagine someone terribly addicted
to heroin who has alienated their friends and family and descended into
depravity and desperation. By understanding them as a creature that realizes
value through time, we can appreciate the extraordinary disvalue of them
shooting up, even though doing so provides them with deep, albeit
temporary, pleasure.32 Of course, when viewed as a standalone moment, their
pleasure would be of great value, but that is not how we understand (or should
understand) our existences, as if we were reborn in every moment.33
There is an empirical and a normative idea built into this diachronic
conception of human value. The empirical idea is that, unlike simple animals,
we understand that our past gives shape to our present, and that our present
gives shape to our future. Further, given our powers of autonomy, value
recognition, memory, and imagination, we have the capacity to purposefully
act in the present as a means of constructing a more valuable future and more
valuable life as a whole.34 The normative idea is that our most important and
valuable functionings rely upon this diachronic understanding and capacity.35
We can develop our personalities. We can build romantic partnerships. We
can raise children. We can maintain long-term friendships. We can learn
complex skills, trades, and arts. On this view, such “temporal goods”
represent our most significant and meaningful achievements. Unlike eating
ice-cream cones, we can realize them only incrementally and progressively,
usually in association with other people.36

30. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
31. Bronsther, Torture and Respect, supra note 7, at 428; Bronsther, Moral Limits of
Punishment, supra note 9, at 2381.
32. Bronsther, Torture and Respect, supra note 7, at 468; see also Bronsther, Moral
Limits of Punishment, supra note 9, at 2381.
33. Bronsther, Torture and Respect, supra note 7, at 469; Bronsther, Moral Limits of
Punishment, supra note 9, at 2381.
34. Bronsther, Moral Limits of Punishment, supra note 9, at 2407; see also Bronsther,
Torture and Respect, supra note 7, at 470 n.210 (arguing that our personal identity retains
sufficient integrity over time, such that “we” will still be there in the future, to some very
significant degree, to reap the costs or benefits of our present decisions).
35. Bronsther, Moral Limits of Punishment, supra note 9, at 2407.
36. See id.; see also id. at 2410 (arguing that many temporal goods are associational in
nature).
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We can use this brief analysis of diachronic human value to make more
sense of the “objective” harm of the death penalty on the comparativist view.
On this view, death at forty is harmful insofar as it denies us the everyday
“momentary” pleasures of continued living, but more importantly, because it
denies us the opportunity to continue maintaining, developing, arranging, and
balancing the temporal goods that constitute, or might constitute, our good
life as a whole. Much more so than the person who dies at a very old age in
a frail state, the person who dies at forty will have unfinished life projects.37
Their essentially “human” undertaking, that is, the story of their life as a
whole, will be unceremoniously and unexpectedly over. Many of the chapters
of their story will remain unwritten and, for the person who has committed a
heinous offense, there will be no redemption narrative. Ronald Dworkin
makes a related point in the context of euthanasia, writing about a person
who has become “permanently sedated or incompetent”:38 “We worry about
the effect of his life’s last stage on the character of his life as a whole, as we
might worry about the effect of a play’s last scene or a poem’s last stanza on
the entire creative work.”39
But what about the fact that our stories are going to end anyway, in the
sense that we’re all going to die at some point? This is a crucial question for
understanding what the death penalty does to someone. Indeed, with this
question in mind, we can appreciate how the death penalty is, I think,
fascinatingly different from noncapital sentences. We’re all going to die, but
we aren’t all going to spend time in prison. Thus, what the death penalty does,
essentially, is to move up your death date dramatically. You were going to
die at some vague point in the future, and you planned your diachronic
existence around that notion. But once the date and time arrive, the death
penalty means that you will die right now. In this way, death at forty takes
decades away from otherwise reasonably anticipated living. And given the
sequential and progressive nature of human existence, this deprivation of
time grievously interferes with one’s project of building a good life as a
whole.
Now that we have some grasp of the “objective” harm of the death
penalty—or, at least, of one plausible conception of that harm—we can
37. See Kai Draper, Disappointment, Sadness, and Death, 108 PHIL. REV. 387, 397–98
(1999) (“[T]he discovery that an unlikely death at an advanced age will deprive one of several
additional years of life is apt to be less disappointing than the discovery that one will suffer a
comparable deprivation of life at an early age.”).
38. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 199 (1993).
39. Id.
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incorporate “expressive” harm into the analysis. The expressive harm is
generated, in part, by the fact that it is the state that carries out the killing. To
die of disease at forty is one thing; to die from state violence is another. The
state, in its capacity as representative of the people, expresses public
meanings and valuations relatively clearly. Further, with capital punishment,
the state kills with intention and premeditation, seemingly endorsing and
desiring the individual’s death, as evidenced by the enormous amount of time
and resources that the state spends between the moment of arrest and the
moment of death.40 Albert Camus argued that even intentional crimes like
murder cannot match the heavy purposiveness and deliberateness of the
criminal process leading to the death penalty.41
State intentionality matters when assessing the message expressed by
harmful state action, as Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes emphasize in
their expressivist theory of constitutional law.42 For instance, when assessing
regulations that disparately impact certain racial43 or ideological groups,44
they explain that the message expressed depends on whether the state
intended the disparate outcome, with the state being motivated to
disadvantage the group in question, or whether it was a byproduct of realizing
some other state aim.45 In this way, they argue that we must look beyond
consequences when discerning the message expressed by harmful state
action, since “attitudes are expressed in the purposes for which people act
and the principles that justify their action.”46 We can combine the
“expressive” power of intentional state action with the “objective” notion that
an early death interferes terribly with one’s essentially human diachronic
existence. The expressive result is that the state, when it carries out capital
40. Unrelated to the costs of appellate litigation, the Federal Bureau of Prisons spent
nearly $4.7 million on five executions carried out in July and August 2020, with most of the
costs spent on the logistics of arranging execution teams. See Records Disclose Taxpayers
Picked Up a Nearly Million Dollar Price Tag for Each Federal Execution, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR. (Feb. 3, 2021), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/records-disclose-taxpayerspicked-up-a-nearly-million-dollar-price-tag-for-each-federal-execution.
41. ALBERT CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 199 (Justin O’Brien trans.,
1961) (“Many laws consider a premeditated crime more serious than a crime of pure violence.
But what then is capital punishment but the most premeditated of murders . . . ?”).
42. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1531–56 (2000).
43. See id. at 1533–45.
44. See id. at 1545–51.
45. See id. at 1533–51; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (holding
that a facially neutral law is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact).
46. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 42, at 1569.
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punishment, emphatically denies an offender’s right to exercise their lifebuilding capacities and, thereby, emphatically denies their standing as a
human. Put differently, when carrying out the death penalty, the state
expresses the idea that the offender has forfeited their status—their
essentially “human” status—as a life-builder. More modestly, at a minimum,
the state expresses the idea that the offender has forfeited the privileges and
immunities associated with that status.47
The expressive power of the death penalty is bolstered by the notion that
the diachronic conception of human value has a basis not only in
philosophical thought but also in everyday cultural norms. Without being
able to fully defend the claim here, it seems that nearly every culture prizes
such inherently “temporal” achievements—families, knowledge, careers,
artistic endeavors, etc.—as being central to the ideal of a good and especially
“human” existence.48
II. Life and Prison
With this framework in mind, we can begin to see how the intentional state
injury of prison can be on a par with, or at least not qualitatively different
than, the intentional state injury of capital punishment. The death penalty is
extreme in the severity of the objective and expressive harm that it imposes
on an offender, but the harm is not incommensurate or incomparable with
that imposed by prison.49 More to the point, if the harm of the death penalty
is centered on denying an offender’s status as a life-builder, then noncapital
sentences, especially very long sentences, can objectively and expressively
impact someone in an analogous manner.
As I have argued previously, incarceration, at a minimum, represents a
severe restriction on the freedom of association, insofar as an inmate will be
denied effective access to almost all people in society, including family,
friends, neighbors, and co-workers, as well as “new people” that they might

47. Thanks to Steve Schaus and Will Thomas for helpful discussion on this point.
48. There is little worry here, I think, of an overly Western bias, given that the pursuit of
temporal goods seems central to every culture. For thoughtful discussion on objectivity and
Western bias in the context of discerning the centrally “human” functionings, see MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 34–69 (2000).
49. See Jacob Bronsther, Vague Comparisons and Proportional Sentencing, 25 LEGAL
THEORY 26, 27–36 (2019) (arguing that any two things can be compared in terms of the degree
to which they exhibit a particular value, such that there is no such thing as “incomparability”);
see also Cian Dorr et al., The Case for Comparability, 56 NOÛS (forthcoming 2022), https://
philpapers.org/archive/DORTCF-2.pdf (same).
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meet in environments conducive to enjoyable and productive relationships.50
As the years pass by, this associational limitation gravely impacts the quality
of a person’s life as a whole because temporal goods—which are so central
to diachronic flourishing—are usually associational in nature. Some
temporal goods, like a romantic partnership, are intrinsically associational,
meaning that the good itself is a long-term form of association. Others, like
the development of professional expertise, are instrumentally associational,
meaning that one realizes such a good by associating with other people. By
making it exceedingly difficult for an inmate to realize either type of
associational good, long-term incarceration makes it extremely difficult for
an inmate to construct a good life as a whole.
To be sure, it is a matter of degree and risk. Here, incarceration is different
than the death penalty. Unlike the person killed by the state, it is not
impossible for the long-term incarcerated to flourish, whether in prison or
after they are released (if they are in fact released). Some people are
extraordinary. Nonetheless, by intentionally placing an offender in an
environment that is so intensely inhospitable to realizing diachronic value,
and by forcing them to stay there for a very long period, the state effectively
denies the presence or worth of their capacity to stitch moments together
through time as a means of constructing a good life as a whole. In this way,
long-term incarceration denies an offender’s status as a life-builder and
belongs in the same category of injury as the death penalty.
But how “long” must the sentence be? Some have analogized life without
parole to the death penalty,51 especially when imposed on juveniles,52 but
surely sentences shorter than that would qualify. There is not a precise
answer, however. Between those sentences that affirmatively deny an
50. See Bronsther, Moral Limits of Punishment, supra note 9, at 2400–04. Of course,
unless inmates are placed in solitary confinement, they will certainly interact with people in
prison—people who become familiar over time and “new people” as well—but generally in
an environment that is far less conducive to meaningful interactions by comparison to life
outside of prison. See Sharon Dolovich, Two Models of the Prison: Accidental Humanity and
Hypermasculinity in the L.A. County Jail, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 965, 1002–07
(2012) (arguing that general population units in the L.A. County Jail have an inmate culture
that requires “hypermasculine” posturing, which in turn suppresses qualities associated with
“femininity,” such as emotional expression, sensitivity, and kindness).
51. See generally LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? (Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012) [hereinafter LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE].
52. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that juvenile offenders cannot
be sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide offenses); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 489 (2012) (holding that mandatory sentences of life without parole are unconstitutional
for juvenile offenders).
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offender’s status as a life-builder and those that do not, there is a vague
middle ground. Given the moral stakes, it would seem that we ought to keep
far away from sentences that might reject an offender’s humanity, following
Jeremy Waldron’s notion that we should give wide berth to vague but
prohibited realms such as “domestic violence” or “torture,” and should not
go as close to the line as possible.53 He writes: “There are some scales one
really should not be on, and with respect to which one really does not have a
legitimate interest in knowing precisely how far along the scale one is
permitted to go.”54 Regardless, there are sentences that I believe are clearly
outside the zone of vagueness—say, twenty years in prison without any
serious possibility of parole—which would radically alter our sentencing
code were they deemed equivalent to the death penalty as a matter of law and
culture.55
The issue, to be clear, is not whether a sentence severely risks ruining
one’s current life project, with its very particular players and plans. A
relatively short sentence could probably achieve that result. The issue is the
degree to which a sentence makes it more challenging for someone to realize
any conception of a decent human life as a whole. Our mortality looms
53. Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1701 (2005) (comparing situations where people have a legitimate
interest in knowing precisely what their legal liabilities are, e.g., a driver who wants to know
the exact speed limit, with situations where an interest in precision would be inappropriate,
e.g., a husband who wants to know exactly how much he can push his wife around before it
counts as domestic violence).
54. Id.
55. The prohibition on long sentences presented here is thus stronger than the “right to
hope” guaranteed by a recent line of cases in the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”).
Those cases provide that life sentences without the possibility for parole are “inhuman or
degrading” in violation of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. See, e.g.,
Vinter & Others v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317; Trabelsi v. Belgium, 2014V Eur. Ct. H.R. 257. The judges were concerned, mainly, with preventing terms of
incarceration that, given an offender’s rehabilitation, were no longer justifiable by reference
to a member state’s penal rationale (deterrence, retribution, etc.). Vinter, 2013-III Eur. Ct.
H.R. 317, ¶ 111. However, the court also gestured toward a more robust external stop on the
pursuit of penal rationales that would guarantee offenders the opportunity for release as a
matter of their “human dignity.” See id. ¶ 113; see also id. (Power-Forde, J., concurring)
(introducing the concept of “the right to hope”). For thoughtful discussion of Vinter, see
Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 952–55 (2016).
However, the most recent case, Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, limited the “right to hope”
dramatically. Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 57592/08 (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170347. The ECtHR provided that a life term would be
legal, so long as there was some chance, even an extremely remote chance, of releasing an
offender upon his rehabilitation, as set out in advance by relatively clear procedures. Id.
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hugely in the background of this analysis, just as it did with the death penalty.
We have only so much time to associate with others to produce the temporal
goods that might constitute our good lives as a whole. And given our limited
existences, being radically deprived of the freedom of association for twenty
years would severely risk ruining one’s life project in this broader sense, even
if the prison facility were uncommonly safe and comfortable. Of course, the
quality of life in prison is a crucial variable, and it varies dramatically from
facility to facility. To the extent that people are neither safe nor
comfortable,56 fewer years would surely be required for a sentence to deny
someone’s status as a life-builder, given the risks of long-lasting physical and
psychological harm.57
Beyond the deprivations of prison itself, we ought to incorporate postcarceral deprivations into our analysis. Examples include the presence of an
intrusive and threatening probation officer; inability to access public
housing; loss of the job one held before prison; difficulty finding work due
to gaps on one’s resume, as well as employers’ right to check one’s exconvict status; placement on a sex-offender registry; losing the right to vote
and sit on juries; etc.58 A “short” sentence, when combined with the “civil
death”59 caused by these collateral consequences, may render the pursuit of
a decent life so onerous as to belong in the category of life-crushing
punishments beyond the pale.60 In that case, there would be no qualitative
56. See, e.g., U.S DEP’T OF JUST. CIV. RTS. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF ALABAMA’S STATE
PRISONS FOR MEN (2020), https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/1297031/down
load?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery (reporting utterly horrendous conditions
in Alabama state prisons for men).
57. On the relevance of confinement conditions for determining a proportional sentence,
see Lisa Kerr, How the Prison Is a Black Box in Punishment Theory, 69 U. TORONTO L.J. 85,
92–93 (2019); Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 307, 409–19 (2004); RICHARD L. LIPPKE, RETHINKING IMPRISONMENT 104–28 (2007).
58. See generally JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD (2015); ALICE
GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014); AMY E. LERMAN &
VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN
CRIME CONTROL (2014); Christopher Uggen et al., The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit
of the Effects of Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 627 (2014);
Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789 (2012).
59. See Chin, supra note 58.
60. See Judith Resnick, (Un)Constitutional Punishments: Eighth Amendment Silos,
Penological Purposes, and People’s “Ruin,” 129 YALE L.J.F. 365, 369 (2020) (“[T]his
constitutional democracy has no licit penological purpose in seeking to ruin people
economically or by imposing destructive forms of confinement. . . . [G]overnments are not
supposed to use their punishment powers to debilitate people . . . .”).
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difference between “short” and “long” prison sentences or, indeed, between
“short” sentences and the death penalty. To be sure, the “life harm” of long
prison sentences results from the associational deprivation that is inherent or
analytic to the prison. By comparison, we could have prisons and short
sentences without burdensome collateral consequences; indeed, not every
society treats ex-prisoners so punitively.61
While I believe these life-crushing sentences are flatly impermissible,
there is a more modest conclusion available, which still offers the possibility
of radical policy change, as suggested above. Imagine that one steadfastly
rejects the non-contingent argument against the death penalty. That is, they
believe that sometimes people really do forfeit their humanity and their right
to build a good life, such that the state can permissibly kill them as a form of
punishment. Now, if one believes in the death penalty along these lines,
presumably they believe it is legitimate only in response to the most extreme
offenses. One could combine this position with my conclusion that certain
prison sentences (especially but maybe not exclusively very long sentences)
belong in the same category of punishment as the death penalty. The upshot
is that those sentences would be permissible, but only in the very special
cases in which the death penalty would be an acceptable alternative.
Conclusion
This Essay is centered on the following set of ideas: humans are lifebuilders, such that they realize value diachronically and cumulatively,
primarily by building and maintaining temporal goods; humans do not forfeit
their status as life-builders when they commit offenses; and, thus, the state
must respect and not destroy the life-building capacities of offenders. These
ideas condemn punishments that severely risk ruining an offender’s life as a
whole, a category that includes not only the death penalty but also many
prison sentences. To use Justice Brennan’s language once more, such
punishments “treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to
be toyed with and discarded.”62
Alternatively, if a community is willing or even eager to inflict such
punishments, whether of the capital or noncapital variety, then that
community should understand that it upholds the principle that offenders at

61. See PROBATION ROUND THE WORLD: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Koichi Hamai et al.
eds., 1995).
62. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272–73 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
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least sometimes do forfeit their humanity.63 By this logic, all American
jurisdictions—even those that have abolished the death penalty—endorse
this forfeiture principle, such that at least certain offenders can permissibly
be “toyed with and discarded,”64 as evidenced by the hundreds of thousands
of individuals currently serving decades-long sentences. Indeed, in
jurisdictions opposed to the death penalty but accepting of such prison
sentences, their opposition to capital punishment may be explained more by
squeamishness than by any conviction about the moral status of people who
commit offenses.
This Essay merely introduces the question of how the death penalty relates
to prison sentences. There are many unresolved moral and legal questions
that I hope to pursue elsewhere, such as whether the long-term confinement
of a demonstrably dangerous individual could ever be consistent with the
values espoused here, the proper role for rehabilitation and parole within a
legitimate penal system, and how the Supreme Court might incorporate these
concerns into its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.

63. See Kleinfeld, supra note 55, at 941 (“Implicit in American punishment is the idea
that serious or repeat offenses mark the offenders as morally deformed people rather than
ordinary people who have committed crimes. Offenders’ criminality is thus both immutable
and devaluing: it is a feature of the actor, rather than merely the act, and, as such, it diminishes
offenders’ claim to membership in the community and loosens offenders’ grip on certain basic
rights.”); Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE,
supra note 51, at 96, 104 (“In the new punitive climate, . . . to commit a criminal act is to
reveal oneself as essentially and uniformly bad and thus not entitled to the consideration or
respect otherwise due fellow human beings.”); Avlana K. Eisenberg, Getting to “Prisoner as
Neighbor,” 75 OKLA. L. REV. 69 (2022).
64. Furman, 408 U.S. at 272–73 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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